The petitioner has challenged the judgment dated 09.02.2026 of the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench, which had refused his post-arrest bail in FIR No.555/2025 under section 489-F PPC, registered at Police Station Hattar, District Haripur. According to the FIR, the petitioner purchased poultry goods worth Rs. 2,600,000 from the complainant and issued a cheque that was later dishonoured, forming the basis of the prosecution case. As the case rests entirely on documentary evidence already secured by the authorities and the petitioner is no longer required for investigation, he seeks bail on the grounds that continued detention serves no useful purpose. It is further argued that the alleged offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497 Cr.P.C., where bail is ordinarily granted unless exceptional circumstances exist—none of which have been demonstrated. While the prosecution contends that the petitioner is involved in other similar cases, reliance on past judgments suggests that such involvement alone is not sufficient to deny bail unless exceptional factors are present.

law helps the vigilant and not the indolent. That appeals challenging such compensation must be filed within the prescribed limitation period, as delay—especially by government departments—cannot be excused through generic claims of administrative processing or inter-departmental movement of files. That limitation laws apply equally to the State and private litigants, and condonation requires a specific, convincing explanation of each day’s delay. That careless or routine reliance on bureaucratic delays does not constitute “sufficient cause,” and courts will not extend extraordinary leniency to government bodies. Consequently, an appeal barred by time and lacking substantive grounds cannot be entertained, even when filed by the provincial government.

 The petitioner/husband challenged two orders of the Union Council and the High Court’s decision regarding divorce proceedings initiated by respondent No.2/wife through delegated powers. The Supreme Court noted that the respondent No.2/wife had served a divorce notice under Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and lawfully withdrew it within the mandatory ninety-day period, meaning the divorce never took effect. The Court reaffirmed that Section 7 applies to all forms of talaq, including talaq-e-bidat, and that no divorce becomes effective until ninety days after notice, allowing withdrawal within that time. It further held that the petitioner/husband’s subsequent divorce notice was rightly disposed of for lack of jurisdiction, as at the relevant time the respondent No.2/wife was residing in New York and proceedings should have been initiated before the Pakistan Mission there. The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court had correctly applied the law, and therefore found no error in the impugned judgment.

 In rape cases, DNA evidence carries strong independent evidentiary value and can reliably establish the involvement of the accused even when other factors—such as reporting delays, absence of violence marks, or social pressures—affect the case. That properly preserved DNA remains credible despite time gaps, and its strength as scientific proof can sustain a rape conviction without requiring additional corroborative evidence. In rape cases, DNA evidence carries strong independent evidentiary value and can reliably establish the involvement of the accused even when other factors—such as reporting delays, absence of violence marks, or social pressures—affect the case. That properly preserved DNA remains credible despite time gaps, and its strength as scientific proof can sustain a rape conviction without requiring additional corroborative evidence.

Two companies, M/s Tanveer Cotton Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. and M/s Tanveer Spinning & Weaving Mills (Pvt.) Ltd., filed petitions for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment ordering their winding up. The judgment, dated June 17, 2021, appointed official liquidators to manage the companies. The companies, represented by former chief executive Mian Azhar Saleem, challenged the judgment. However, the respondent banks argued that since the companies were under liquidation, they couldn’t file petitions through their former chief executive. The court appointed amici curiae for assistance and ultimately decided that the companies, through their board of directors, could appeal the winding-up order.

Masood Ahmad Bhatti and another v. Khan Badshah and another

The petitioners, through Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, challenged the judgment of the Islamabad High Court dismissing their appeal regarding the sale of “Najeeb Plaza” in Islamabad to Khan Badshah. The petitioners, represented by Masood Ahmad Brighti, sold the plaza to Khan Badshah under an agreement for Rs. 80,000,000, with a partial payment of Rs. 10,000,000 made. Despite extensions and further payments, the petitioners refused to transfer the plaza. Consequently, Khan Badshah filed a suit for specific performance, leading to a decree in his favor by the trial court and subsequent dismissal of the appeal by the High Court. The petitioners contended various issues, including payment source and alleged fraud by Khan Badshah, but the courts found in favor of Khan Badshah, emphasizing his compliance with payment terms. The courts also noted the lack of evidence supporting the petitioners’ claims, leading to the dismissal of their petition and refusal of leave to appeal.

SUMMARY: The case involved a decree for maintenance against a father, questioning whether it could be executed against the grandfather. The court emphasized that the right thing must be done in the right way, emphasizing the need for a fair trial and due process. It ruled that a decree against the father cannot be executed against the grandfather, and the child must initiate a separate maintenance suit if the father’s property is insufficient for execution.

SUMMARY: The petitions challenge a Sindh High Court judgment maintaining the order in a summary suit against respondents for loan default. The petitioner, a Microfinance Institution, filed the suit based on promissory notes, seeking repayment within 24 months. Trial and Appellate Courts deemed the suits non-maintainable under summary procedures, insisting on plenary jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, however, held that the promissory note, integral to the finance agreement, validates summary jurisdiction. The judgment sets aside previous orders, remanding the case for trial under Order XXXVII of the Civil Procedure Code, emphasizing the negotiability and clarity of the promissory notes.